

RV-ECU: Certifiable Runtime Verification for Automobiles

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Why Bother?




- NSF (Phase I) and NASA (Phase II) SBIR grants
 - Want to be sure technology is useful before developing it
- What you can get from it
 - Reduce or avoid car recalls
 - Safety requirements not violated, dynamically updatable
 - Even if car is hacked (no distinction between hacked or malfunctioning ECU)
 - Easier compliance to ISO 26262 for safety
 - Safety monitors generated automatically (provably correct)
 - Enhanced communication between OEMs and suppliers
 - Formal safety specifications will be required and shared
 - Easier, better, faster testing
 - Separation of major concerns: safety versus functionality

Background



Modern automobiles highly computerized, including dozens of Electronic Control Units (ECUs) communicating over the CAN bus



The Importance of Recall



- Recall is the most important unsolved problem in automotive
- Recalls are costly (\$2B+) and bad for business, and software related recalls are (increasingly) common




Software Complexity Trends




- More ECUs, more money on electronics, more features, more code


ECUs in a typical Luxury car



E/E as % of Average Vehicle Cost



Code Size (MB) Mercedes S-class




Source: "Automotive Embedded Software Verification and Validation Strategies", Shankar Akella, Emmeskay Advanced Technology Solutions

ISO 26262 Reshapes Safety



- ISO 26262 changing the face of automotive: first functional safety standard, in response to growing software complexity trends



- Both OEMs and suppliers scrambling for compliance

Problem




- Current state-of-the-art not ideal
 - Formal safety requirements not available
 - OEMs blame suppliers, suppliers blame OEMs
 - ECUs developed by suppliers; code not available
 - Poor CAN bus architecture
 - Any ECU can send messages to any other ECU
 - ECU sent messages cannot be stopped


Proposal



- RV-ECU: in charge of monitoring global safety
 - Provably correct (both monitoring and recovery code)
- ECUs locally monitored
 - Their critical CAN bus messages “approved” by local monitors
 - Local monitors communicate with RV-ECU
 - Local monitors achieved by instrumentation or API



Local vs. Global (RV-ECU) Monitor



- All monitoring code (red) generated automatically from safety requirements; recovery code verified
 - Certifiably correct (checkable proofs also generated)
- Local monitors added through instrumentation (automatically) or provided API, and can
 - Prevent ECU from sending wrong messages
 - Consult with RV-ECU to assure global safety
 - Add authentication


Example



Informal requirements

Safe door lock


Doors should always open only if they were unlocked in the past and not locked since then; at violation, close door.
...(hundreds of these)



Formalize requirements
(by domain experts,
using various formalisms;
here an interval logic)

Formal requirements

$\forall d$: **always** (Open(d) **implies**
not Lock **since** UnLock)
@violation : Close(d)



Automatically
generated

Monitor for each d

```
// One such monitor instance
// in RV-ECU for each door d

State: one bit, b

b = UnLock || !Lock && b
if (Open && !b)
then send(Close)
```

Provably
correct

Current RV-ECU Progress

- Prototype RV-ECU on an STM ECU board [STM3210C-EVAL](#)
 - Working on a real car (model omitted)
 - controlling wipers, windows, doors
 - soon engine and brakes
- For the time being, local monitors intended to be as simple as just requesting acknowledgements for messages to be sent on the bus from RV-ECU
 - So RV-ECU does all monitoring, but local monitors ensure that safety violating messages are not sent



Wrap Up



- Certifiable runtime monitoring code generation
 - Technology developed at the University of Illinois over a period of more than 12 years, funded with more than \$6M by NSF, NASA, DARPA, NSA, Boeing
 - Product for increasing safety in cars to be developed in our small company with SBIR funding from NSF, NASA, and research collaborations with automotive companies
 - Main insight: separate safety from functionality and take no chances with safety (use highest assurance known for it!)
- Practical impact sought:
 - Looking for collaboration, partnership, leverage, matching funding (for our NASA and NSF grants)